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It is widely accepted among axiomatic bargaining theorists that if one bargainer is more 
risk averse than a second, the second will be a tougher bargaining opponent than the ﬁrst 
against all opponents. We argue that this relationship between risk aversion and bargaining 
toughness is both highly fragile, and more nuanced than previously articulated. In the 
Nash and Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining frameworks, we establish that when a bargainer 
is compared with a second who is “almost globally” more risk averse than the ﬁrst, 
the supposedly immutable relationship between bargaining effectiveness and risk aversion 
evaporates. Speciﬁcally, we identify an upper-hemicontinuity failure of a correspondence 
which maps the power set of all lotteries to those utility pairs that satisfy our “almost 
global” comparative risk aversion relation on these subsets. We trace the consensus view 
that tougher bargainers are less risk-averse to an exclusive focus on precisely the point at 
which this correspondence implodes.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC 
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
In the extensive literature on axiomatic bargaining theory, it is widely accepted that bargainers who are less risk-averse 
make tougher bargaining opponents.1 This connection has been identiﬁed as “one of the results most frequently quoted in 
the bargaining literature” (Volij and Winter, 2002, p. 120). The ﬁrst formal statements of the result are in the seminal works 
by Roth (1979) and Kihlstrom et al. (1981) (henceforth KRS). The theme is further developed in Roth and Rothblum (1982)
(RR) and Safra et al. (1990) (SZZ). In particular, KRS’s Theorems 1 and 2 relate, respectively, to the two best-known axiomatic 
bargaining models, developed by Nash and Kalai–Smorodinsky (KS). These theorems compare bargaining situations in which 
a given opponent with utility v bargains either against a benchmark player with utility u0, or against another, globally more 
risk-averse player with utility u.
For brevity, we shall henceforth identify players with their utility functions: “u bargains with v” will serve as short-
hand for “the player with utility function u bargains against another with utility function v .” We henceforth say that w is a 
tougher2 NashKS -bargainer than w
′ against v if NashKS bargaining with w yields v less utility than bargaining with w
′ . KRS’s 
results establish that under both solution concepts, if u is more risk-averse than u0, then u0 is a tougher bargainer than u.
✩ Authors are grateful to Rachael Goodhue, Larry Karp, Jeff La France, Ariel Rubinstein, Hugo Sonnenschein, and Christian Traeger for helpful conversations, 
to two anonymous referees for their suggestions and to Qu Tang and Youngdong Liu for excellent research assistance.
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1 See, e.g., Kannai (1977), Sobel (1981), Osborne (1985), Thomson (1988) and Roth (1989).
2 Throughout the paper, the relations “tougher than” and “more risk-averse than” will be irreﬂexive, i.e., the relevant inequalities will be strict rather 
than weak.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.003
0899-8256/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
2 G.C. Rausser, L.K. Simon / Games and Economic Behavior 95 (2016) 1–9In this paper, we argue that the widely cited relationship between comparative global risk aversion and comparative 
bargaining toughness is in fact both highly fragile and more nuanced than has previously been articulated. It is fragile in 
the sense that if the notion of “global” is relaxed ever so slightly, in a particular direction, the relationship evaporates. It can 
be reﬁned by distinguishing between risks that matter for bargaining toughness and those that don’t: in particular, in both 
frameworks, comparative aversion to risks involving a positive probability of negotiation breakdown — the worst possible 
outcome — plays a pivotal role. In the Nash framework, there is a link — in a sense to be made precise — between compar-
ative bargaining toughness and comparative aversion to lotteries involving bad outcomes, but no relationship whatsoever if 
the lotteries involve only good outcomes. In the KS framework, we identify a necessary and suﬃcient condition for u to be 
a tougher bargainer than u0 against v; it can never be satisﬁed if u is globally more risk averse than u0, but can be satisﬁed 
if u is “almost globally” more risk averse than u0, in the sense we deﬁne. Finally, we establish that given any benchmark 
bargainer u0, there is, in both frameworks, a bargainer u who is strictly tougher than u0 against every bargaining opponent, 
yet is more risk averse than u0 with respect all lotteries except those that assign positive probability either to negotiation 
breakdown, or to comparably bad negotiated outcomes. Since u0 is a strictly tougher bargainer against all opponents than 
any u who is globally more risk averse than u0, our result reveals a discontinuity — more precisely, an upper hemicontinuity 
failure — in the relation that maps comparative risk aversion to bargaining toughness.
To make these ideas precise, we formalize our notion of “almost globally more risk averse than. . . ” in the following way. 
The standard deﬁnition of comparative risk aversion is3: “u is more risk averse than u0 if any risk that is undesirable for 
u is also undesirable for u0.” If the universe of possible lottery outcomes is X , then it is natural to assert that u is almost 
globally more risk averse than u0 if for some subset X ′ ⊂ X that almost coincides with X , any risk involving only outcomes in 
X ′ that is undesirable for u0, is also undesirable for u. This comparison leaves open the possibility of some remaining risks
— necessarily ones which assign positive probability to realizations in X\X ′ — that are undesirable to u0 but acceptable to u. 
If we apply our notion of “almost” to a sequence of subsets {Xn} that approach X , while excluding the very worst outcomes 
in X , the risks which remain exempt from comparison are concentrated in a vanishingly small subset of the universe of 
all possible risks. Yet for any n, the set of utility pairs 〈un, u0〉 which satisfy our “almost global” comparison criterion is 
extremely large, relative to the set of pairs 〈u, u0〉 such that u is globally more risk averse than u0. These much larger sets, 
that meet our comparative criterion for each n, include pairs 〈un, u0〉 such that un is a much tougher bargainer than u0.
1. Preliminaries
In the classical formulation of axiomatic bargaining problems, two players, with utility functions u and v respectively, 
bargain over a set of possible feasible outcomes. If they fail to agree upon one of these, a disagreement outcome, D , is 
implemented. (In general, outcomes are points in R2, so utilities are multivariate. With one additional assumption, they can 
be represented by univariate functions. To reduce notation, we will use the same symbols for utilities and their univariate 
representations.) We assume that players’ utilities are deﬁned on the simplex Z = {z ∈ R2+ : zi ≥ 0; 
∑2
i=1 zi ≤ 1} and that 
D = (0, 0). Throughout, we assume that u derives utility only from the ﬁrst component of z ∈ Z , while v derives utility only 
from the second. We will hold v constant and compare the “bargaining performance” of utility u against v relative to that 
of a benchmark utility u0. Let S = {
(
u(z), v(z)
) : z ∈ Z} ⊂ R2 denote the set of utility pairs that can be agreed upon, and 
let d = (u(D), v(D)) ∈ R2 denote the utility pair that results from disagreement. Following Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, 
p. 10), we deﬁne a bargaining problem to be a pair 〈S, d〉, where S ⊂R2 is compact and convex and there exists s ∈ S such 
that s 
 d. Let B denote the set of all bargaining problems. A bargaining solution is a function f : B → R2 that assigns to 
each bargaining problem 〈S, d〉 ∈ B a unique element of S .
1.1. Bargainer utilities
In Sections 1–2, we impose two assumptions on bargainers’ utility functions:
Assumption A1). Utilities are von Neumann–Morgenstern, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable on Z . For all z ∈
[0,1]2 , ∂u(z)
∂z1
> 0 and ∂v(z)
∂z2
> 0.
An axiom invoked by both Nash and KS is that if either u or v is replaced by an aﬃne transformation of itself, the 
bargaining outcome must remain unchanged.4 We therefore assume, w.l.o.g.
Assumption A2). Each player derives utility 0 from D and a maximum utility of 1 on Z .
A second axiom imposed in both frameworks requires that the bargaining solution must lie on the Pareto frontier, which 
is the north-east boundary of Z , i.e., {(x, 1 − x) : x ∈ [0, 1]}. Invoking this axiom, we restrict our attention to this frontier, 
3 Eeckhoudt et al. (2005, Defn. 1.4, p. 14). Eeckhoudt et al. add the caveat that u0 and u must have the same level of income. In the context of bargaining 
theory, there is no natural notion of “income.”
4 For example, an aﬃne transformation of u is a function w = a + bu, for some (a, b) ∈R ×R++ .
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understanding that the scalar x ∈ P represents the vector (x, 1 − x) ∈ Z . Thus, u(x)v(x) will denote the utility that uv derives from 
the share x1− x . We can now rewrite A1) as
for all x ∈ P , u′(·) > 0 > v ′(·). (1)
To streamline our presentation, we restrict attention to a compact family of utility functions:
Assumption A3). Bargainers’ utilities are drawn from a set U of functions satisfying Assumptions A1)–A2) that is compact in the sup 
norm topology.5
1.2. Risk aversion
The seminal papers that have considered comparative risk aversion in bargaining models compare players’ risk aversion 
over the entire domain of their utility functions. This paper augments these comparisons with analogous ones on subsets 
of the utility domain. Following Eeckhoudt et al. (2005), we will say that bargainer u is globally more risk-averse than u0
(abbreviated to GMRA) if any risk that is undesirable for u0 is “even more” undesirable for u. (Throughout this paper the 
term “more” will denote a strict relation.) Analogously, we say that u is strictly risk-averse than u0 on X ⊂ P (abbreviated to 
MRAX ) if any risk involving outcomes in X that is undesirable for u0 is even more undesirable for u.
The literature has identiﬁed three equivalent ways to formalize the concept of GMRA. All three can be extended imme-
diately to MRAX . First, for each X ⊂ P , we deﬁne u to be MRAX than u0 if6 u|X = φ(u0|X ), where φ is an increasing, strictly 
concave function.
Prop. 1. (Adapted from Eeckhoudt et al. (2005, Prop 1.5).) For X ⊂ P , the following three statements are equivalent:
a) u is MRAX than u0;
b) ∀x ∈ X, ru(x) := − u′′(x)u′(x) > r0(x) := −
u′′0(x)
u′0(x)
;
c) for any uncertain event z˜ with distribution μ whose support is contained in X, u−1(Eμ[z˜]) > u−10 (Eμ[z˜]).
ru(·) and r0(·) in b) are the Arrow–Pratt coeﬃcients of absolute risk aversion for u and u0, respectively (Pratt, 1964, 
p. 122); u−1(Eμ[z˜]) and u−10 (Eμ[z˜]) in c) are the certainty equivalents7 of the lottery z˜, for u and u0 respectively.
We focus primarily on subsets of P of the form [x,1]. For every x > 0, the restriction MRA[x,1] is strictly weaker than 
GMRA; however, when x= 0, the two relations coincide, since [0, 1] = P . The condition that u is MRA[x,1] than u0 imposes 
several restrictions on the relationship between u and u0, which are summarized in Lemma 1. Part e) of the lemma invokes 
some terminology: we say that u intersects u0 at x if u(x) = u0(x). Further, we say that u cuts u0 from belowabove at x if u
intersects u0 at x and if u′(x)  u′0(x), with strict inequality if x < 1.
Lemma 1 (Implications of MRA[x,1]). For x ≥ 0, suppose that u is MRA[x,1] . Then
a) ddz
(
u′(·)
u′0(·)
)
< 0 on [x,1];
b) If ∃y ∈ [x,1] s.t. u′(y) ≥ u′0(y), then u′(·) > u′0(·) on [x, y);
c) If ∃y ∈ [x, 1) s.t. u′(y) ≤ u′0(y), then u(y) > u0(y);
d) If u(x) = u0(x), then u(·) > u0(·) on (x, 1);
e) if u(y) < u0(y) for some y ∈ [x, 1), then ∃ y˜ ∈ (y, 1] s.t. u cuts u0 from below at y˜.
In words, if u is MRA[x,1] than u0 then: b) if u is weakly steeper than u0 at y, it is strictly steeper to the left of y; c) if 
u is weakly ﬂatter than u0 at y, then it lies above u0 at y; d) if u and u0 agree at x, then u dominates u0 on the interior 
of [x,1]. e) if u is dominated by u0 at y, then when it intersects u0 at some y˜ > y — which it must, by Assumption A2) — 
u’s slope at y˜ will strictly exceed u0’s if y˜ < 1, and weakly exceed u0’s if y˜ = 1.
Since by Assumption A2), u0(0) = u(0) = 0, an immediate implication of part d) of Lemma 1 is:
Remark 1. If u is GMRA than u0 then u(·) > u0(·) on the interior of P .
5 For functions with domain S , a metric for the sup norm topology is: ρ( f , g) = sups∈S | f (s) − g(s)|.
6 Given f : Y →R, and Y ′ ⊂ Y , f |Y ′ denotes the restriction of f to Y ′ , i.e., the function g : Y ′ →R such that for all x ∈ Y ′ , g(x) = f (x).
7 The certainty equivalent for u of a lottery z˜ is a certain outcome y which yields u the same utility as z˜.
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We focus on the two best-known axiomatic bargaining solution concepts, fN and fKS , formulated, respectively, by 
Nash (1950, 1953) and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975). Nash imposed four axioms: Symmetry, Pareto Eﬃciency, Invariance 
to Equivalent Utility representations, and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA).8 He showed that these four axioms 
are satisﬁed by a unique element of P , which is the argmax, denoted fN , of the function N (·|u, v) deﬁned in (2) below. 
Having imposed Assumption A2), we can deﬁne the Nash bargaining outcome as9:
fN (u, v) = argmaxx∈P N (x|u, v), whereN (x|u, v) := log(u(x)) + log(v(x)) (2)
fN (u, v) is the unique x value that solves the ﬁrst-order condition
∂N (x|u, v)
∂x
= 0 = u
′(x)
u(x)
+ v
′(x)
v(x)
. (3)
Because N (·|u, v) is continuous and strictly concave, and because (from A2)) N (x|u, v) approaches −∞ as x approaches 
either 0 or 1, a unique solution to (3) exists. Moreover,
for all u, v satisfying Assumptions A1)–A2), fN (u, v) ∈ (0,1). (4)
KS’s axiomatic framework replaces Nash’s IIA axiom with a monotonicity axiom. KS’s concept is deﬁned in terms of the 
disagreement utility vector — in our case, (0, 0) — and the vector — in our case, (1, 1) — representing the highest utility 
that each player can obtain from some negotiated agreement.
In words, the KS outcome is the intersection of the Pareto frontier of S with the 45◦ line (in utility space) through the 
origin. Formally,
f KS(u, v) = KS(·|u, v)−1(0) where KS(x|u, v) := u(x) − v(x). (5)
That is, fKS(u, v) is the (unique) root of KS(·|u, v). Once again, we have
for all u, v satisfying Assumptions A1)–A2), f KS(u, v) ∈ (0,1). (6)
Further, since the set U from which utilities are drawn is compact10:
there exists ¯ > 0 s.t. if u, v ∈ U, then for sc ∈ {KS,N } f sc(u, v) ∈ [¯,1− ¯]. (7)
Now ﬁx v ∈ U . Let x
N
0
xN
denote the Nash outcome, and let 
xKS0
xKS
denote the KS outcome, when u0u bargains against v . Since 
v prefers lower x-values to higher ones (see (1)), the classical result is that if u is GMRA than u0, then xN0 > x
N and 
xKS0 > x
KS . We will identify conditions under which these inequalities are reversed. We say that
u is a tougher Nash
KS
-bargainer than u0 against v if x
N > xN0
xKS > xKS0
. (8)
Both comparisons in (8) are deﬁned relative to speciﬁc solution concept and a speciﬁc bargaining partner. We also deﬁne a 
notion of “global relative toughness”:
u is a tougher bargaining opponent than u0 if
against every v ∈ U, u is a tougher Nash- and KS-bargainer than u0. (9)
Using Lemma 1, Lemmas 2 and 4 below identify conditions under which, for any x > 0, u is MRA[x,1] than u0 and a tougher 
KS- or Nash-bargainer than u0 against v .
Lemma 2 (Necessary and suﬃcient condition: KS). For x > 0, if u is MRA[x,1] than u0 and x < xKS0 , then u is a tougher KS-bargainer 
than u0 against v iff u cuts u0 from below at some x > xKS0 .
Lemma 2, combined with Remark 1, provides an alternative proof of KRS’s result associating the GMRA relation to 
relative KS-bargaining toughness: for u to be KS-tougher than u0 against v , u must cut u0 from below; but from Remark 1, 
this cannot happen if u is GMRA than u0. Conclude:
8 Apart from the Pareto and Invariance axioms, the others invoked by Nash and KS play no role in the present paper beyond implying the solution 
concepts deﬁned by (2) and (5). Accordingly, we do not deﬁne them here. For a presentation and detailed discussion of each axiom, see Osborne and 
Rubinstein (1990).
9 More generally, N (x|u, v) := log(u(x) − u(D)) + log(v(x) − v(D)). Assumption A2) imposes u(D) = v(D) = 0.
10 Clearly, fN is a continuous function of u and v . Since U is compact, fN attains a maximum and minimum on U × U (Weierstrass). From (4), both 
maximum and minimum belong to (0, 1). We can now deﬁne ¯N =minu,v∈U ( fN (u, v), 1 − fN (u, v)). Deﬁne ¯KS analogously, and let ¯ =min(¯N , ¯KS ).
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Prop. 2. (See KRS, Thm 2.) If u is GMRA than u0 , then u0 is a tougher KS-bargaining opponent than u.
Turning to Nash, Lemma 3 below provides a useful characterization of when u is a tougher Nash bargainer than u0
against v , although the condition does not depend on u being MRAX than u0.
Lemma 3 (Necessary and suﬃcient conditions: Nash). u is a tougher Nash-bargainer than u0 against v iff 
u′(xN0 )
u(xN0 )
>
u′0(xN0 )
u0(xN0 )
.
Lemma 3 has an appealing intuitive interpretation: u is a tougher Nash-bargainer than u0 against v iff, at the solution 
to the bargaining problem between u0 and v , the elasticity11 of u’s utility w.r.t. u’s negotiated share is greater than the 
corresponding elasticity for u0.
The relationship between comparative risk aversion and toughness is less clearcut in Nash’s framework than in KS’s. 
Lemma 4 is a partial analog of Lemma 2, but it is not a characterization.
Lemma 4 (Suﬃcient conditions: Nash). For x > 0, if u is MRA[x,1] than u0 , and u cuts u0 from below at some x ≥ xN0 , then u is a 
tougher Nash-bargainer than u0 against v.
Since the inequality in the condition of Lemma 4 is weak — (u cuts u0 from below at x ≥ xN0 ) — but the inequality that 
the condition implies is strict — (xN > xN0 ) — it follows from continuity that the condition cannot also be necessary; there 
must exist an open neighborhood X containing xN0 such that if u cuts u0 from below at any x ∈X , then xN > xN0 . Indeed, 
in contrast to the KS formulation, it is not necessary for comparative Nash-toughness that u cuts u0 from below at any point: 
as Fig. 1 illustrates, u can be Nash-tougher than u0 against v , even when u lies everywhere above u0. (For heuristic clarity, 
we have drawn u and u0 in the ﬁgure as piecewise linear, so that neither function satisﬁes Assumption A1); obviously, there 
are smooth perturbations of both functions which do satisfy Assumption A1), while preserving the salient properties of the 
ﬁgure.) When u0 bargains against v = u0, by symmetry the Nash solution is xN0 = 0.5. But since u0 kinks at xN0 −  , while 
u kinks just to the right of xN0 , we have u
′(xN0 ) 
 u′0(xN0 ), while u(xN0 ) ≈ u0(xN0 ). It follows from Lemma 3, therefore, that 
when  > 0 is suﬃciently small, xN > xN0 . Note in this example that for x = xN0 −  , u is MRA[x,1] than u0. (Clearly, u|[x,1]
is a concave transformation of u0[x,1] .) However, u is not GMRA than u0: for example, as the ﬁgure illustrates, there is a 
lottery z˜, which realizes x with probability p and zero otherwise, and a sure outcome y, such that
11 Given a function f of x, the elasticity of f w.r.t. x is deﬁned as x ∂ f (x)/∂xf (x) .
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so that u prefers z˜ to the certain outcome y, but u0 prefers y to z˜.
Our next result, Proposition 3, is closely related to, but distinct from, the classical result that if u is GMRA than u0, 
then u0 will be a tougher Nash-bargaining opponent than u against v . To establish that u0 is Nash-tougher than a speciﬁc 
opponent v , it suﬃces to assume only that u is more averse than u0 with respect to risks involving outcomes that are less 
satisfactory to u than the solution obtained when u0 Nash-bargains against v . In is in precisely this sense that what matters 
when it comes to Nash bargaining is relative aversiveness to risk over bad outcomes.
Prop. 3. If u is MRA[0,xN0 ]than u0 , then u0 is a tougher Nash bargainer than u against v.
For completeness, we restate KRS’s result for Nash-bargaining, which is the analog of Proposition 2 above: it can be 
rederived as an immediate corollary of Proposition 3
Prop. 4. (See KRS, Thm. 1.) If u is GMRA than u0 , then u0 is a tougher Nash-bargaining opponent than u.
We now come to the main result of this paper: for any x > 0 no implication can be drawn about u’s bargaining toughness 
relative to u0’s from the fact that u is MRA[x,1] than u0. Recalling that ¯ was deﬁned in (7):
Prop. 5. ∀x ∈ (0, ¯) and u0 ∈ int(U), ∃u ∈ U who is MRA[x,1] than u0 and a tougher bargaining opponent than u0.
Now let R : [0, 1)U×U denote the correspondence mapping selected subsets of P to the utility pairs that satisfy our 
comparative risk aversion relation12:
R(x) = {〈u,u0〉 ∈ U × U : u is MRA[x,1] than u0}. (10)
For each n, MRA[x,1] is a strictly weaker comparative concept than GMRA, but in the limit, the distinction disappears, since 
[0, 1] = P . In the informal language of our introductory section, when n is very large, R(1/n) consists of utility pairs 〈un, un0〉
such that un is “almost globally” more risk averse than un0, while R(0) consists of pairs 〈u, u0〉 such that u is globally more 
risk averse than u0, The disjunction between Proposition 5 and Propositions 2 & 4 is a consequence of the fact that R(·) is 
not upper hemicontinuous13 at x= 0.
Proposition 5 establishes that for each n > 1/¯, there exists a pair 〈un, un0〉 ∈R(1/n) such that un is a tougher bargaining 
opponent than un0. Yet from Propositions 2 & 4, if u is GMRA than u0, then u0 is a tougher bargaining opponent than u. 
Since “tougher than” has been deﬁned as a strict relation, and both the Nash and KS solution concepts are clearly continuous 
when their domains are endowed with the metric γ , deﬁned in footnote 12, these propositions, taken together, necessarily 
imply that R(·) is not upper hemicontinuous at zero.14
Fig. 2 above graphs a pair of utilities, 〈u¯, u0〉, which illustrate two key messages of this paper. First, it demonstrates that 
u¯ may be a tougher bargainer than u0, even though u¯ is more averse than u0 to all risks except ones involving a positive 
probability of an extremely undesirable outcome. Second, it reveals the magnitude of the implosion (upper hemicontinuity 
failure) of the correspondence R(·) at zero. Since the ﬁgure serves only as a heuristic example, we do not require that u0
belongs to the compact set U speciﬁed in Assumption A3).15 Moreover, in the ﬁgure, u0 is drawn for clarity as piecewise 
linear, with a kink at x; as in Fig. 1, it can obviously be smoothened and made strictly concave without changing any salient 
features of the example.
If x < ¯ ≤ min
{
f sc(u¯, v) : v ∈ U , sc ∈ {KS, N }
}
, then since u¯ lies everywhere below u0, u¯ will be a tougher bargainer 
than u0 against every opponent v ∈ U (Lemmas 2 and 4). On the other hand, u0 is risk neutral, and hence less risk-averse 
than u¯ with respect to all lotteries except ones that assign positive probabilities to outcomes on either side of x. The ﬁgure 
illustrates one such exception: u¯ prefers the illustrated certain outcome y to the lottery z˜ realizing x1 < x < x2 with equal 
probability, while u0 prefers z˜ to y. Indeed when x ≈ 0, u0 is risk neutral with respect to all risks except ones involving 
a positive probability of either negotiation breakdown or negotiated outcomes that are barely preferred to breakdown. 
To summarize, the example challenges the conventional wisdom, since: a) u¯ is more risk averse than u0 with respect to 
12 Since R(·) is deﬁned on R, we endow its domain with the Euclidean metric. We endow its co-domain with the metric γ (f, g) =
max(ρ( f1, g1), ρ( f2, g2)), where ρ is the sup norm metric (footnote 5).
13 A correspondence ψ : S T is upper hemicontinuous if for every s ∈ S and every open neighborhood  of ψ(s) there is an open neighborhood S of s
such that ψ(s′) ⊂  for every s′ ∈S .
14 While for Nash-bargaining, this implication is a little opaque, for KS-bargaining, it is transparent: from Remark 1, 〈u, u0〉 ∈R(0) implies u(·) > u0(·)
on (0, 1). Since from Assumption A2), u ∈ U implies u(0) = 0 and u(1) = 1, it follows that  := {〈u, u0〉 ∈ U × U : u(·) > u0(·) on (0, 1)} is an open 
neighborhood of R(0). Now consider an arbitrary open neighborhood S of 0. For n suﬃciently large, 1/n ∈ S . From Proposition 5, there exists 〈un, un0〉 ∈
R(1/n) such that un is a tougher KS-bargaining opponent than un0. From Lemma 2, un must cut un0 from below. Hence 〈un, un0〉 /∈  .
15 For any given compact set U , if x is suﬃciently small, u0 will no longer belong to U . However, neither of the heuristic messages conveyed by the 
example depend on this inclusion.
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“virtually all” risks except for ones effectively involve negotiation breakdown; but b) is (much) a tougher bargainer than 
u0 against all opponents in U , in both the Nash and KS frameworks. On the other hand, the properties that the example 
exhibits are intuitive: u0 desperately wants to achieve an agreement, but cares very little about which particular agreement 
is obtained. Unsurprisingly, against almost all v ’s, the agreement predicted by both the Nash and KS frameworks will 
overwhelmingly favor v , delivering u0 a share in a neighborhood of x.
The second purpose of Fig. 2 is to illustrate the magnitude of the correspondence R(·)’s implosion at zero. For each 
n ∈N, there is a pair 〈u¯, un0〉 ∈R(1/n), with un0 having the same form as the function u0 displayed in the ﬁgure, speciﬁcally 
un0(x) =
{
(n−1)x if x<1/n
(n+x−2)/(n−1) otherwise . Clearly, for much of its domain — for example, on (x, 1/2)) — we have u¯(·)  un0(·). On 
the other hand, from Remark 1, 〈u¯, u0〉 ∈ R(0) implies u¯(·) ≥ u0(·). Thus, for any n, R(0) is a much smaller set than 
R(1/n). Indeed, for each  > 0, there exists δ > 0 and N such that for n > N , un0(δ) > 1 − 0.5 while 〈u¯, u0〉 ∈R(0) implies 
u0(δ) < 0.5 . Hence, in the metric on function pairs deﬁned in footnote 12, γ (〈u¯, un0〉, 〈u¯, u0〉) > 1 −  . To summarize, we 
have established that there is a sequence {〈u¯, un0〉} such that for all n, 〈u¯n, u0〉 ∈R(1/n), and limn{〈u¯n, u0〉} is of γ -distance 
1 from any pair 〈u¯, u0〉 ∈R(0). The signiﬁcance of this implosion will be immediately apparent: for any n, the set R(1/n)
is huge relative to R(0); there is room in the former set for a very diverse array of different kinds of bargainer pairs, 
including pairs such as 〈u¯, un0〉, where u¯(·)  un0(·), and is much a tougher bargainer than un0. But at the point of implosion, 
all bargaining pairs 〈u¯, u0〉 are eliminated unless they satisfy u¯(·) ≥ u0(·).
3. Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to challenge the virtual consensus among bargaining theorists that in axiomatic bargain-
ing theory, comparative bargaining toughness and comparative global risk aversion are inextricably linked. We have argued 
that the relationship between these two comparisons is in fact quite fragile. To demonstrate this fragility, we weaken the 
concept of “globally more risk averse than,” and compare the relative bargaining toughness of two agents, one of whom is 
more averse than the other to “almost all” but not all risks. We show that in this context, the almost globally more risk 
averse agent may be tougher than the other agent against all opponents. More abstractly, we argue that the consensus view 
regarding the relationship between risk aversion and bargaining toughness results from an exclusive focus on an implosion 
point of a correspondence that is not upper hemicontinuous.
The discontinuity we have identiﬁed can be interpreted in one of two ways. If one considers our notion of “almost glob-
ally more risk averse than. . . ” to be closely comparable to “globally more risk averse than. . . ,” then one might conclude that 
the literature has placed excessive emphasis on results such as Propositions 2 & 4. Alternatively, one could take the view 
that “almost globally more risk averse than. . . ” and “globally more risk averse than. . . ” are really quite different concepts, 
because there is something qualitatively different about, on the one hand, risk aversion to lotteries that exclusively involve 
negotiated outcomes, and, on the other, lotteries which assign a positive probability to negotiation breakdown. An implica-
tion of this latter view would be that more attention should be devoted to developing a more nuanced understanding of 
this distinction.
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Proof of Lemma 1. Part a): For z ∈ [x,1],
d
dz
(
u¯′(z)
u′0(z)
)
= u¯
′′(z)u′0(z) − u¯′(z)u′′0(z)
u′0(z)2
= − u¯
′(z)u′0(z)
u′0(z)2
(−u¯′′(z)
u¯′(z)
− −u
′′
0(z)
u′0(z)
)
< 0 (11)
Part b) follows immediately from part a). Part a) also implies
If ∃y ∈ [x,1] s.t. u¯′(y) = u′0(y) then u¯′(·) < u′0(·) on (y,1]. (12)
Part c): Note from b) that if u¯′(y) ≤ u′0(y), then u¯′(·) < u′0(·) on [y, 1). From Assumption A2), u¯(1) = u0(1). Hence,
u¯(y) = u¯(1) −
1∫
y
u¯′(y)dy > u0(1) −
1∫
y
u′0(y)dy = u0(y)
Part d): Since u¯(1) = u0(1), u¯(x) = u0(x) implies 
∫ 1
x (u¯
′(y) −u′0(y))dy = 0. Hence, ∃ y¯ ∈ [x, 1) s.t. u¯′( y¯) = u′0( y¯). From part b), 
u¯′(·) > u′0(·) on [x, y¯), so that u¯(·) > u0(·) on (x, y¯). From (12), u¯′(·) ≤ u′0(·) on [ y¯, 1]. From part c), u¯(·) > u0(·) on [ y¯, 1).
Part e): Assume that u¯(y) < u0(y), for some y ∈ [x, 1). Since u¯(1) = u0(1) = 1, there exists at least one y′ ∈ (y, 1] such 
that u¯(y′) = u0(y′). Let y˜ denote the smallest such number. If y˜ = 1, then u¯′( y˜) ≥ u′0( y˜) (since otherwise ∃ > 0 such that 
u¯′(·) > u0(·) on (1 − , 1) and hence some y′ < y˜ such that u¯(y′) = u0(y′)). If y˜ < 1, then from part c), u¯′( y˜) > u′0( y˜). In 
either case, u¯ cuts u0 from below at y˜.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Sufficiency: Fix x > xKS0 s.t. u¯ cuts u0 from below at x. From part b) of Lemma 1, u¯
′(·) ≥ u′0(·) on [xKS0 , x), so that u¯(xKS0 ) <
u0(xKS0 ), and hence, KS(xKS0 |u¯, v) <KS(xKS0 |u0, v) = 0. From (1) and (5), ∂KS(·|u¯,v)∂x > 0. Hence, xKS > xKS0 .
Necessity: Assume that xKS > xKS0 . In this case,
u¯(xKS) = v(xKS) < v(xKS0 ) = u0(xKS0 ) < u0(xKS)
The two inequalities follow from (1); the two equalities follow from (5). It now follows from part e) of Lemma 1 that u¯ cuts 
u0 from below at some x ∈ (xKS0 , 1].
Proof of Lemma 3. Since N (·|u¯, v) is strictly concave, fN (u¯, v) =N (·|u¯, v)−1(0) > xN0 iff ∂N (x
N
0 |u¯,v)
∂x > 0. Since by deﬁni-
tion 
∂N (xN0 |u¯,v)
∂x =
u¯′0(xN0 )
u0(xN0 )
+ v ′(xN0 )
v(xN0 )
:= 0, ∂N (xN0 |u¯,v)
∂x > 0 iff 
u¯′(xN0 )
u¯(xN0 )
u¯′(xN0 )
u¯(xN0 )
+ v ′(xN0 )
v(xN0 )
>
u¯′0(xN0 )
u0(xN0 )
.
Proof of Lemma 4. Fix x ≥ xN0 s.t. u¯ cuts u0 from below at x. By deﬁnition, u¯′(x) ≥ u′0(x). From part b) of Lemma 1, 
u¯′(·) > u′0(·) on [xN0 , x). Hence, u¯(xN0 ) < u0(xN0 ). From (3), ∂N (x
N
0 |u¯,v)
∂x >
∂N (xN0 |u0,v)
∂x = 0. Since N (·|u¯, v) is strictly concave, 
∂2N (xN0 |u¯,v)
∂x2
< 0. Hence, xN > xN0 .
Proof of Proposition 3. From (11), we have that ddz
(
u¯′(·)
u′0(·)
)
< 0 on MRA[0,xN0 ] . That is, there exists a strictly decreasing 
function α(·) on [0, 1] such that for all x ∈ MRA[0,xN0 ] , u¯′(x) = α(x)u¯′0(x). Therefore we can write u¯(x
N
0 )
u0(xN0 )
=
∫ xN0
0 u¯
′(y)dy∫ xN0
0 u¯
′
0(y)dy
=
∫ xN0
0 α(y)u¯
′
0(y)dy∫ xN0
0 u¯
′
0(y)dy
. From the ﬁrst mean value theorem for integration, (Wikipedia, 2015), there exists xˆ ∈ [0, xN0 ] such that 
∫ xN0
0 α(y)u¯
′
0(y)dy = α(xˆ) 
∫ xN0
0 u¯
′
0(y)dy. Since α(·) is strictly decreasing, and u¯′0(·) > 0, it follows that 
∫ xN0
0 α(y)u¯
′
0(y)dy >
α(xN0 ) 
∫ xN0
0 u¯
′
0(y)dy, and hence that xˆ < x
N
0 . Hence 
u¯(xN0 )
u0(xN0 )
= α(xˆ)
∫ xN0
0 u¯
′
0(y)dy∫ xN0
0 u¯
′
0(y)dy
= α(xˆ) := u¯′(xˆ)
u¯′0(xˆ)
>
u¯′(xN0 )
u¯′0(xN0 )
. Hence 
u¯′0(xN0 )
u0(xN0 )
>
u¯′(xN0 )
u¯(xN0 )
. The result now follows from Lemma 3. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Fix u0 ∈ int(U). Since r0(·) (deﬁned in part b) of Proposition 1) is continuous and takes values on 
the compact set P , it attains a maximum on P . Hence ∃c ∈ R+ s.t. c > r0(·) on P . For each z ∈ Z s.t. z1 ∈ (x/2, 1], let 
ψ(z) = exp(exp(−cz1)), and deﬁne f (z) = log
(
ψ
(
(1, 0)
))− log(ψ(z)) ≤ 0. Let g be a smooth extension of f to Z satisfying 
f (D) = 0. For λ ∈R+ , let u¯λ = u0 + λg (so that u¯0 = u0). Clearly, the set of functions satisfying Assumption A1) is open (in 
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λ is suﬃciently small. We now have, ∀λ.
∀x ∈ [0,1], ∂ u¯
λ(x)
∂λ
= f (x) < 0 (13a)
and ∀x ∈ [x, 1):
f ′(x) = c
exp(cx)
> 0; f ′′(x) = −c
2
exp(cx)
< 0 (13b)
∂
∂λ
(
∂ u¯λ(x)
∂x
)
= f ′(x); ∂
∂λ
(
∂2u¯λ(x)
∂x2
)
= f ′′(x) (13c)
∂
∂λ
(
∂ u¯λ(x)
/
∂x
u¯λ(x)
)∣∣∣∣∣
λ=0
= f
′(x)u0(x) − f (x)u¯′0(x)
u0(x)2
> 0 (since f (x) < 0) (13d)
∂ru¯
λ
(x)
∂λ
= u¯
′
0(x) f
′(x)
(u¯′0(x) + λ f ′(x))2
(
c − r0(x)
)
> 0 (13e)
Inequality (13e), together with Proposition 1:b) implies that ∀λ > 0, u¯λ is more risk averse than u0 on [x,1], and hence 
that 〈u¯λ, u0〉 ∈ R(x). Moreover, (13a) implies that for all λ, u¯λ(·) < u0(·). Necessarily, therefore, u¯λ cuts u0 from below 
at 1. Moreover, since u0, v ∈ U , we have from (7) that ¯ ≤ min(xN0 , xKS0 ). Since by assumption, x < ¯ , Lemmas 2 and 4 are 
applicable and the result now follows. 
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